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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Casey argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied 
him due process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the record 
on appeal with a transcript of the change of plea hearing, held on October 20, 2010, the 
sentencing hearing, held on November 22, 2010, and the rider review hearing, held on 
May 17, 2011. Mr. Casey argues that the requested transcripts are necessary for his 
appeal because the district court could utilize its own memory of the prior proceedings 
when it executed a sentence after relinquishing jurisdiction. In response, the State 
argues that the only relevant transcripts are those from the probation violation 
disposition hearing and the Rule 35 hearing. 
Mr. Casey argues that the requested transcripts are relevant because a district 
court can rely on its own memory of the prior proceedings when it makes a sentencing 
decision. Since Idaho appellate courts conduct an independent review of the entire 
record when determining whether a district court abused its discretion in regard to a 
sentencing determination, what was specifically presented to the district court at the 
probation violation disposition hearing and the Rule 35 hearing does not define the 
scope of review concerning the sentencing issue. The only questions are: whether the 
information at issue was before the district court at any of the prior hearings, and 
whether that information is relevant to the sentencing issues on appeal. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in ML Casey's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Casey due process and equal protection 
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Casey's probation?1 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Casey's Rule 35 
motion requesting leniency? 
1 Mr. Casey will only address issue I in this brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Casey Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary 
Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
In Idaho, district courts consider a broad range of information when making 
sentencing decisions. Due to this broad range of information considered, Idaho 
appellate courts have scrupulously required defendants to provide an extensive 
appellate record because they conduct an independent review of the entire record 
before the district court when determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred in 
regard to a sentencing determination. In other words, the question on appeal generally 
does not focus on how or what the district court actually considered. Instead, the 
central question is whether the record before the district court supports its sentencing 
determination. 
Since Idaho appellate courts need to have all of the relevant information that was 
before the district court to conduct this analysis, they will presume that any missing 
information supports the trial court's determination and refuse to rule on the merits of 
the issue. In some instances, the Court of Appeals has refused to address the merits of 
issues on appeal due to the appellants' failure to provide transcripts of hearings which 
were never discussed by the district court and occurred years before the disposition of 
the issue on appeal. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Casey Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With 
Necessary Transcripts 
The State argues that the requested transcripts are not necessary for this appeal 
because this court only has appellate jurisdiction over the orders currently on appeal 
and the mere fact that a district court can utilize its own memory of the prior 
proceedings when making a subsequent sentencing determinations does not make all 
of the prior proceedings relevant. (Respondent's Brief, p.9-10.) The State's argument 
disregards the applicable standard of review. The Court of Appeals' standard of review 
which is relevant to the length of a sentence which is executed following the revocation 
of probation was articulated in State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26 (Ct. App. 2009). In that 
case, the Idaho Court of Appeals resolved an ongoing dispute about the proper 
standard of review in probation revocation cases. Id. at 27. Relying on State v. 
Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2008), and State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 392 (Ct. 
App. 1992), the State sought to limit review to only facts that had arisen between the 
original pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation proceedings. Hanington, 
148 Idaho at 28. Essentially, the State's position would have eliminated any need for 
appellate courts to review the change of plea hearing transcript, the sentencing 
transcript, and the presentence report because all of that information would have been 
available to the district court prior to the original sentencing hearing. See id. Hanington 
argued that the proper standard of review should include a review of "all facts existing 
both at the time of the original sentence and at the time the sentence is ordered into 
execution," relying on the standard established in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 
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1055-1056 (Ct. App. 1989). Id. at 27. The Court of Appeals agreed with Hanington and 
held: 
Id. 
The State has read our somewhat differing versions of the scope of review 
too restrictively. We have not intended to suggest that our review is limited 
solely to events occurring between the original imposition of sentence and 
the decision to order the sentence into execution. When we review a 
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we 
will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the 
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation. 
The Hanington Court made it clear that when determining what sentence to 
execute, the appellate court would review the entire record, including the factors at the 
original sentencing hearing through the probation revocation before the court on appeal. 
The rationale behind this clarification makes perfect sense when looking to State v. 
Adams, the decision that explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire 
record when reviewing the executed sentence: 
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution 
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially 
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The 
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events 
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing 
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a 
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant 
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked, 
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an 
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the 
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on 
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a 
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a 
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see 
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no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the 
appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56. As such, when an appellant challenges the length of 
his/her sentence, the applicable standard of review requires an independent and 
comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as well as the events 
which occurred during, the disposition of the matter at issue. The basis for this standard 
of review is that the judge "naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of 
events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision." Id. Based on that 
presumption, the Court of Appeals held that, "When reviewing that decision, we should 
consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not hold that the district court 
must expressly reference the prejudgment events in order for this standard of review to 
become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals assumed the judge will 
automatically consider the prejudgment events when determining whether to execute or 
reduce a sentence. 
The State also argues that the requested transcripts were never presented to the 
district court and, therefore, was never part of the record before the district court. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.6.) Contrary to the State's position, the question of whether the 
transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district court at the time of the 
probation violation disposition hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the transcripts 
are relevant to the issues on appeal. That is because, as argued in the Appellant's 
Brief, in reaching a sentencing decision, a district court is not limited to considering only 
that information offered at the proceeding from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court 
is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official position and observations. 
Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 
7 
Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are 
based, in part, upon what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 
318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of 
criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district 
and the quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 
1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could 
be expected to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). 
Thus, whether the prior hearing was transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the district 
court could rely upon the information it already knew from presiding over the hearings at 
issue. Moreover, in Adams, supra, the Court of Appeals presumed that the district court 
would rely upon such information and, therefore, needed transcripts of the prior 
proceedings to consider the same facts presumptively utilized by the district court. 
Additionally, the State's position is unworkable because all transcripts, except a 
transcript of the hearing from which an appeal is taken, would be deemed new 
information. This is inconsistent with the holding from State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 
276 (Ct. App. 2000), where the district court examined the defendant about his guilty 
plea during the change of plea hearing. Since the defendant in Burdett failed to provide 
a transcript of that hearing on appeal, the Court of Appeals presumed that something 
occurred in that hearing which supported the district court's sentencing decision. Id. 
If the State's argument is taken to its logical conclusion, a transcript of a 
defendant's original sentencing hearing would be not be relevant in instances where an 
appeal is filed from a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. Further, if that is not relevant 
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information, a district court should not, absent a transcript, consider what happened at 
sentencing when evaluating a Rule 35 motion. However, in State v. Wright, 114 Idaho 
451, 452-453 (Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to address the merits 
of an appeal from the denial of an Rule 35 motion because the appellant failed to 
provide the PSI and a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the appellate record. See 
also State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1984). 
In sum, the applicable standard of review of a sentencing determination on 
appeal requires access to the requested transcripts because the Court of Appeals 
presumes that the district court will rely on its memory of those proceedings when it 
made its final sentencing determinations. It follows that an appellate court reviewing a 
district court's sentencing determination will need to have access to the same 
information utilized by the district court. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Casey respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Casey respectfully 
requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions for the district court to place 
him on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Casey respectfully requests that this Court reduce 
the fixed portion of his sentence. 
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Alternatively, Mr. Casey respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence 
as it deems appropriate 
DATED this 2yth day of March, 2013. 
//--l &---·· 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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